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CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-ACQUISITION OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY AFTER REJECTION BY BoARD OF DIRECTORS-Defendant Odlum,
president and director of Airfleets, Inc., was privately offered the opportunity to buy patents for a self-locking nut and the stock of the company
which held an exclusive license to manufacture it. The board of directors,
when offered the opportunity by Odlum, approved purchase of the stock but
rejected the patent rights. Odlum then purchased these rights for himself and a minority stockholder brought a derivative suit for an accounting.
Held, a director is absolutely disqualified from purchasing a corporate
opportunity for himself, even after the opportunity has been rejected by
a disinterested majority of the board of directors. Any other rule would
necessitate an attack upon and judicial evaluation of the subjective business
judgment of the board. Greene v. Allen, (Del. Ch. 1955) 114 A. (2d) 916.
The principal case marks a significant departure from the general rule
that rejection of a corporate opportunity1 by a disinterested majority of the

1 The reasons given for the finding of a corporate opportunity in Airfleets, a company
organized to finance the sale and lease of airplanes [see MOODY, BANK AND FINANCE
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board of directors gives an officer or director the privilege of taking advantage of the opportunity.2 One lone case, Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch,3
was cited as authority for the somewhat remarkable position of the instant
case. That case held that a plea of corporate inability to perform a contract admittedly essential to the corporation's existence does not justify
the directors' action in taking over the contract for themselves.4 But even
if such a ruling was justified, the rationale of the case was the encouragement of fiduciaries to exert their best efforts to help raise the necessary
funds by closing off any possible alternative and more profitable avenue.
The breach of duty found by the court was the action of the directors in_
placing themselves in a position where their self-interest would tend to
limit their efforts in helping the corporation to carry out its commitments.
That the directors involved were in a position where the dual nature of
their interests prejudiced the corporation is borne out by the court's observations on the facts justifying the rule. 5 The rule in the principal case,
however, is based not on the dual position of the interested director but
on the difficulty in ascertaining the basis of judgment of the disinterested
majority of the board in dismissing a potential opportunity as undesirable
-in effect carrying the conclusive presumption of self-interest attached
to the interested director over to the whole board. 6 Even if the Irving Trust
MANUAL 903 (1951)], would suggest that the interest of the corporation and the duty of
the defendant extend to an extremely wide range of investment opportunities. See,
generally, Fuller, "Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal
Business Activities of Directors," 26 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 189 (1941); 13 TEMPLE L. Q.

™Q~

.

.

After the ruling of disqualification, the court in the principal case proceeded to
find an alternative ground of liability based on a finding that Odlum had dominated the
board and had not sustained the burden of proving its good faith. While this weakens
the authority of the case on the per se disqualification rule, it also tends to perpetuate
the rule by limiting the probability of further appeal.
2 Cowell v. McMillin, (9th Cir. 1910) 177 F. 25; Turner v. American Metal Co., 268
App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 800 (1944), app. dismissed 295 N.Y. 822, 66 N.E. (2d) 591
(1946); McKee v. Brazzle, 99 Okla. 36, 225 P. 520 (1924); American Circular Loom Co. v.
Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 84 N.E. 133 (1908); Sandy River R. v. Stubbs, 77 Me. 594, 2
A. 9 (1885); REsrITUTION REsrATEMENT §191 (1937); 3 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP., perm ed.,
§862.1 (1947); 39 CoL. L. REv. 219 (1939); 31 CALIF. L. REv. 188 (1943).
~ (2d Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 121, cert. den. 294 U.S. 708, 55 S.Ct. 405 (1934).
4Authority for the rule was Wing v. Dillingham, (5th Cir. 1917) 239 F. 54, which
held director transactions voidable per se on facts which the court admitted were too
oppressive to allow the contract to be enforceable in equity, even in the absence of a
fiduciary duty. It should be noted that the court in the Irving Trust case cited the
facts there, not the case rule, which is believed to be almost obsolescent today. See
notes 9 and 10 infra. For the suggestion that the real basis of the decision in the Irving
Trust case was the unfairness of the transaction, see 35 CoL. L. REv. 289 (1935).
5 The principal defendant had been empowered by the board to secure the needed
funds. The defendant was indebted to the corporation in an amount in excess of that
needed to carry out the contract and made no efforts to obtain the needed money after
the board accepted the contract.
6 If the court in the Irving Trust case had believed their rule to be so far-reaching,
there would have been no need for it to dispose of an inter-director settlement also
at issue in the case on the basis of failure by the interested director to make full
disclosure to the board. Cf. Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 531, 47 A. (2d) 479
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case is good precedent for finding a breach of duty by Odium, that case
was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy and does not provide authority
for a suit by a minority stockholder. Most authority leaves discretion to
bring such a suit with the corporate board unless fraud, ultra vires acts,
or oppression are alleged and proved.7 Since the number of cases treating
these problems in the corporate opportunity context are limited, it is helpful to examine the authority in a more active area, that concerned with
transactions between a director and his corporation.8 Almost all jurisdictions hold that where the transaction is approved by an independent majority of the board, it is binding on the corporation, at least "where the
transaction is not unfair to the corporation and the directors have acted
in good faith." 9 New Jersey still holds such transactions voidable by a
majority of the stockholders, 10 but even it does not allow a minority
holder to set aside the fiduciary's contract unless it is ultra vires, fraudulent,
or oppressive. 11
The holding in the principal case is a severe restriction on a director's
investment opportunities. 12 It gives minority stockholders a new sanction
£or "strike suits" to harass the corporation. One share of stock can form
the basis for preventing related but unwanted ventures from being acquired by a trusted fiduciary. 13 Should a stockholder succeed in obtaining
a constructive trust, the corporation would be forced to purchase oppor(1946); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., (Del. 1952) 93 A. (2d) 107; Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chemical Co., (Del. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 660.
7 Karasik v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604 (1935). See Corbus v.
Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 23 S.Ct. 157 (1903); 13 FLETCHER, Cvc.
CoRP., perm ed., §5822 (1947).
s To the extent that a director's contract and the rejection required as a defense to
taking a corporate opportunity both concern the direct dealing of an "interested"
fiduciary with his fellow members of the board, they may be said to involve essentially
the same problem-the difficulty in detecting whether the directors were influenced by
the desires of the interested fiduciary. The analysis is made more meaningful by the
fact that the court in the Irving Trust case treated the quesqon there as one of interdirector dealing.
9 See 3 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., perm ed., §931 (1947); 24 A.L.R. (2d) 60 at 71 (1952).
See also the cases cited in note 6 supra. While there are substantial variations found in
the cases collected under these authorities as to the party who may sue, burden of proof,
and presumption of good faith, the grouping is at least adequate to indicate that the
jurisdictions noted do not allow voidability per se by the corporation.
10 Rothenberg v. Franklin Washington Trust Co., 127 N.J. Eq. 406, 13 A. (2d) 667
(1940). 3 FLETCHER, eve. CORP., perm. ed., §930 (1947) and 24 A.L.R. (2d) 60 at 99
(1952) list a number of cases in which the language suggests that several states other than
New Jersey still follow the minority rule of voidability per se. When these cases are
analyzed in conjunction with the authority cited in note 9 supra, only Maryland, New
York, Iowa, and New Hampshire remain without authority for the majority rule. But
see Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Abbott, 195 Md. 496, 74 A. (2d) 17 (1950); Blaustein v.
Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E. (2d) 705 (1944); Kurtz v.
Oxborrow, 232 Iowa 174, 4 N.W. (2d) 857 (1942); Mica Products Co. v. Heath, 81 N.H.
470, 128 A. 805 (1925).
11 Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 121 •N.J. Eq. I, 187 A. 540 (1936).
12 Cf. Lange Soap v. Ward, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 269 S.W. 851.
13 See McKee v. Brazzle, note 2 supra.
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tunities which the directors may have rejected on the basis of sound business judgment. Acceptance of the rule removes the right or necessity of
judicial examination of the real nature or good faith of such transactions.
Such an examination, utilizing the tools of analysis and practical discretion successfully employed in other areas of the law, is, surely, a preferable
alternative to the inflexible rule of the principal case.
James M. Tobin

